I don't think you fully -or even partially - understand that the chance will never come again. The world was looking for leadership, and we were the most sound (both morally and fiscally) nation on earth. We were also the most powerful. We had a chance to remake the known universe.
I don't necessarily disagree.
I loathe much of what the Bush administration has wrought, particularly in regards to fiscal criminality.
However, I depart from you, to an extent, regarding Bush's handling of "the war on terra".
That growing-problem far transcends the Bush administration.
In terms of attemting to handle said problem, he gets passing marks, from me.
Having said that, we need a new chapter in this fight.
We need a much more comprehensive understanding of what we are dealing with, and more specifically, who we are dealing with. The problem is much bigger than solely the radical, violent Islamic extremists. What makes their movement so dangerous is the tacit support given to them by traditional, non-violent Muslims.
The problem is us vs. them, at least partially. However, it's also more nuanced than that. Tom Friedman characterized this war, in the wake of 9-11, as a war within Islam. Very salient, IMO.
Going forward, our scope needs to be expanded to a point where we are not only directly fighting the extremists, but are also turning the traditionalists against the extremists. As much as Rumsfeld deserved harsh criticism for his blunders, this was the underlying reason behind his 'going on the cheap' in terms of troop levels - he didn't want to create the impression of an occupation. His biggest problem lied in his unwillingness to adapt.
Let's use sports as an analogy. When preparing for a game, pro sports teams extensively scout the oppostion. They scout, they analyze, they scrutinize every bit of available info regarding their opponent so as to best formulate a competitive strategy. When we look at the early stages of Iraq, this was clearly accomplished.
However, in sports, teams react. Counter-punches are thrown, etc. Where Rumsfeld failed miserably was not matching the counter-punch with a counter of his own. He further exacerbated this by stubbornly adhering to a countered strategy when it was clear that a counter-punch connected and a revised strategy was needed.