Moder8
en.wikipedia.org
While the details, enforcement and interpretations vary from state to state here is some examples.
The laws that govern a person's obligations in a state or local jurisdiction with a "stop and identify" law may not be obvious. Hiibel's conviction depended on two different laws:
1. Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 171.123(3), which requires a person to identify himself, but does not provide a penalty for failure to do so.
2. NRS 199.280, which provides a penalty for a person who "... willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office ..."
The Justice Court of Union Township, Nevada, determined that Hiibel's refusal to identify himself[22] constituted a violation of NRS 199.280, the offense of which he was convicted.
The wording of both "stop and identify" laws and "obstructing" laws varies among the states that have enacted such laws. For example, New York's "stop and identify" law[23] allows a police officer to demand that a suspect identify himself but does not explicitly require the suspect to comply, and its "obstructing" law[24] apparently requires physical rather than simply verbal obstruction.[25] Laws in different states that appear to be nearly identical may be different in effect because of interpretations by state courts. For example, California's "stop and identify" law, Penal Code 647(e) had wording[26] similar to the Nevada law upheld in Hiibel, but a California appellate court, in People v. Solomon (1973) , 33 Cal.App.3d 429 construed the law to require "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity. Using this construction, the U.S. Supreme Court held the law to be void for vagueness in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).[27]
Some "stop and identify" laws, such as Colorado's,[28] require a person detained to provide additional information, including an address and written identification if it is available. The wording of the Colorado law is similar to New York's in that it does not appear to impose a duty on the suspect; likewise, a violation of the Colorado "obstructing" law appears to require use or threat of use of physical force. However, the Colorado Supreme Court held in Dempsey v. People, No. 04SC362 (2005) (PDF) that refusing to provide identification was an element in the "totality of the circumstances" that could constitute obstructing a police officer, even when actual physical interference was not employed.[29] As of January 2010, the validity of a law requiring that a person detained do anything more than state his name has not come before the U.S. Supreme Court.
