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The suicide bomber who killed seven C.I.A. officers and a Jordanian spy last week was a double agent who was taken onto the base in Afghanistan because the Americans hoped he might be able to deliver top members of Al Qaeda's network, according to Western government officials.

The bomber had been recruited by the Jordanian intelligence service and taken to Afghanistan to infiltrate Al Qaeda by posing as a foreign jihadi, the officials said.

But in a deadly turnabout, the supposed informant strapped explosives to his body and blew himself up at a meeting Wednesday at the C.I.A.'s Forward Operating Base Chapman in the southeastern province of Khost.

The attack at the C.I.A. base dealt a devastating blow to the spy agency's operations against militants in the remote mountains of Afghanistan, eliminating an elite team using an informant with strong jihadi credentials. The attack further delayed hope of penetrating Al Qaeda's upper ranks, and also seemed potent evidence of militants' ability to strike back against their American pursuers.
www.nytimes.com

The BBC has a story (news.bbc.co.uk) that summarizes the information known thus far about the bombing and also delves into a report by Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn -- described as "the top US military intelligence officer in Afghanistan" -- that rips the American intel efforts in-country. Flynn writes US intelligence is still "unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which US and allied forces operate and the people they are trying to protect and persuade."

The story links to a summary of Gen. Flynn's report, a coauthored paper titled "Fixing Intel A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan" (www.cnas.org) with a link for downloading the PDF (www.cnas.org). Flynn and his coauthors appear to have written for the Center for a New American Security.

Finally, Mark Mardell, the BBC's North America editor, contributes his take on the Flynn et. al. report in "A Damning View of US Intelligence in Afghanistan" (www.bbc.co.uk). From Mardell's piece:

[Flynn's report is extraordinary], for the level of scorn at the failure of his own service, American military intelligence, in Afghanistan over the last eight years: journalistic cliches like "damning" and "scathing" spring to mind.

But it is also extraordinary because this is not the leak of a high confidential memo meant for the eyes of four star generals and top politicians: it is published openly by a think tank, the centre for a New American Security. Remember this is not by an ex-CIA officer a policy wonk, but a serving officer, General McCrystal's senior intelligence officer. He says he's done it this way so as many people as possible read his words.

Many operatives in the field may choke on their rations when they see what Major General Flynn has to say. He says "the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which US and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers".

His basic argument isn't that they are all rubbish at the job, but that they are doing the wrong sort of job. Too focused on the enemy, on detailed analysis of road side bombs and on giving power point presentations to the most senior officers. Not able to see and, more importantly, tell the big picture of the country they are in. He urges them to get out of headquarters, work with soldiers on the ground, talk to people and act more like journalists, as well as historian and librarians. Interestingly he says that 90% of intelligence work these days is what he calls "open source", and quotes a former head of intelligence saying that the job should be more Sherlock Holmes than James Bond.

He says a single-minded obsession with IEDs (roadside bombs to you and me) is understandable but inexcusable if local commanders can't outsmart insurgents as a result and concludes "the intelligence community - the brains behind the bullish might of military forces - seems much too mesmerized by the red of the Taliban's cape. If this does not change, success in Afghanistan will depend on the dubious premise that a bull will not tire as quickly as a Russian bear". This is part of the argument between "counter terrorism" and "counter insurgency" and it is slightly horrifying if American intelligence hasn't been routinely doing the sort of analysis he suggests (I am pretty certain British intelligence sees this as fundamental), but if I was out there I would still want operatives who knew about nasty devices lurking in the ditches.

From an AP update -- www.chron.com :

...one of the big unanswered questions is why so many people were present for the debriefing the interview of the source when the explosive was detonated.

A half-dozen former CIA officers told The Associated Press that in most cases, only one or two agency officers would typically meet with a possible informant along with an interpreter. Such small meetings would normally be used to limit the danger and the possible exposure of the identities of both officers and informants.

The Taliban's Yacoub said the Jordanian intelligence officer, bin Zaid, was helping the CIA recruit agents to spy on al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Bin Zaid allegedly recruited the suicide bomber.

Jordan's state news agency Petra identified bin Zaid as an army officer on a humanitarian mission in Afghanistan. It said he was killed Wednesday evening "as a martyr while performing the sacred duty of the Jordanian forces in Afghanistan." It did not provide other details.

The Jordanian military released a brief statement acknowledging bin Zaid had been killed in Afghanistan, but it did not mention he was working with Jordanian intelligence or cooperating with the CIA.

Bin Zaid's family declined to comment.

Bin Zaid is known to be a relative of Jordan's King Abdullah II. He held the title of sharif, or nobleman, which was bestowed upon him by the Jordanian monarch.

King Abdullah and other members of the royal family received Bin Zaid's body, which was repatriated Saturday in a private ceremony. His wake was held in the Royal Palace.

trueslant.com

FTA: In a bizarre twist, the suicide bomber who killed eight people at a CIA base in Afghanistan may have been a blogger and internet bulletin board admin.

Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, a 36-year-old doctor from Jordan, was also apparently a triple agent who "duped Western intelligence services for months before turning on his handlers."

But first, the blogging and computer nerdery.

It appears al-Balawi, writing under the nom-de-plume Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani, ran the extremely popular jihdaist bulletin board al-Hesbah. Among al-Hesbah's many users, some were people connected to the London tube bombers and others high-ranking al-Qaeda members.

Al-Balawi/al-Khurasani was also a prolific blogger URL abudujanakharasani.maktoobblog
.com who, apparently, liked to daydream about a future caliphate:

The article continues with his his fanzine-quality flight of fanatic fantasy.

A Muslim utupia to him that most civilized folk would view as a dystopia.

Best line in the piece?

The face of Islamist terrorism apparently is this: A 36-year-old doctor posting about future dystopias on internet forums in his free time. He could just as easily have been a Trekkie.

Except blowing yer own ass up kinda defeats the whole idear of "Live Long and Prosper" don't it?

Be Well.